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The covered interest rate parity (CIP) relation is a bedrock of international economics. CIP states that, if foreign exchange (FX) risk is fully hedged, then borrowing at home to lend abroad (or vice versa) is not profitable. Empirical evidence is generally supportive of the CIP, especially for recent sample periods and for the developed countries, except when exchange controls impede the free flow of capital.
In this paper, we document a substantial and persistent breakdown in the CIP relation since the onset of the crisis in August 2007. We measure the deviation from CIP by the US dollar (USD) basis, defined as the difference between the USD rate implied by the CIP relation (henceforth, the "implied rate") and a benchmark unsecured dollar interest rate (e.g. the USD Libor). We show that while the basis is miniscule in normal periods, it has been consistently large and positive since the start of the crisis and increased dramatically after mid-September 2008 following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. For example, the basis estimated using USD Libor as the interest rate and the euro-USD currency rate increased from essentially zero in Observed CIP deviations tend to be short-lived (11 minutes or less) and are not, on average, profit making (Akram, Rime and Sarno (2008) ).
We show that this result is robust to the use of alternative USD interest rates and the use of different currency pairs (of USD vis-à-vis other currencies). If banks contributing to Libor were strategically under-reporting their true dollar borrowing rates during the crisis, as has been alleged, then we might spuriously observe a deviation from CIP with reference to Libor. Holmes and Schott (1965) discuss how severe exchange control restrictions resulted in persistent CIP deviations during the early 1930s to the late 1950s. As these controls eased, CIP deviations became less frequent.
However, we continue to find large deviations from CIP when we use the New York What may have caused this remarkable deviation in the CIP? Keynes (1923) discusses how lack of "floating capital" may impede the CIP relation from holding. In modern parlance, funding constraints during the crisis placed limits to arbitrage (Shleifer and Vishny (1997) , Gromb and Vayanos (2002) , Geanakoplos (2003) , Basak and Croitoru (2006) , and Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) ).
We also find that the USD basis estimated with respect to six currency pairs (USD vis-à-vis the Australian dollar, the euro, the Japanese Yen, the British pound, the Swiss franc, and the New Zealand dollar) shows a similar pattern of sharp increases in the crisis period, and especially since September 2008 (Figure 3 ). 4 We use the model of Garleanu and Pedersen (2009) to explain why the CIP deviations turned positive during the crisis. We discuss how a positive basis was indicative of difficulties in borrowing USD in the unsecured funding market, likely due to reduced supply of and increased global demand for USD during the crisis. We then develop empirical measures of margin conditions and the shadow cost of capital and show that they are significant determinants of the basis. These results indicate that arbitrage trades in the international capital markets were limited during the crisis due to funding constraints. Garleanu and Pedersen (2009) show that, given risk-tolerant investors who are margin-constrained and risk-averse investors who are constrained in their derivatives positions, the basis between a derivative and its asset is non-zero in equilibrium and depends on their relative margins and the leveraged investors' shadow cost of capital.
3 NYFR, published by ICAP and introduced in June 2008, is a trimmed mean of quotes collected from a panel of contributing US banks. To reduce the incentive to under-report, individual quotes and the composition of the panel are not disclosed. And, while Libor panel banks are asked to provide an estimate of their own borrowing costs, ICAP asks only for an estimate of the rate at which a representative A1/P1 bank would be likely to obtain funding. 4 Holmes and Schott (1965) provide examples of increased flow of arbitrage funds associated with lower CIP deviations. In the context of the uncovered interest rate parity, Brunnermeier, Nagel and Pedersen (2008) show that the sudden unwinding of carry trades are attributable to funding illiquidity when speculators near funding constraints.
Another explanation of CIP deviations (also discussed by Keynes (1923) ) is that previously riskless cash flows became risky during the crisis.
5 show that the basis increases in the difference in CDS prices of European and US firms.
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To ease short-term dollar funding constraints, the Federal Reserve agreed to supply dollars to foreign central banks via reciprocal currency arrangements (swap lines) with several developed and emerging market countries. We study changes in the basis on days of Federal
Reserve announcements and auctions related to the swap lines. We find that announcement days of the swap lines program are associated with a reduction in the basis by an average of 5 basis points. We further find that the actual auctions of dollars were also effective in bringing down the basis on the days of operations. Shortly after the Lehman bankruptcy, the Fed announced an increase in the size of swap lines to accommodate any quantity of USD that might be demanded.
We find that uncertainty about counterparty risk became a significant determinant of the basis, particularly in the immediate aftermath of the failure of Lehman Brothers. Taken together, our results therefore indicate a breakdown of arbitrage transactions partly due to lack of funding and partly due to heightened counterparty credit risk, with the relative importance of the two types of risks varying during different stages of the crisis. We find that this announcement was associated with a substantial reduction in the basis of more than 50 basis points during a single day. These results further establish that funding constraints were key drivers of the basis during the crisis.
6 Holmes (1959) shows how CIP deviations tend to increase when sovereign risk and bank credit risk increases. Frenkel and Levich (1977) find that covered arbitrage profits increase during turbulent times. Taylor (1989) shows that deviations from CIP tend to increase during periods of crisis (e.g. the inception of the European Monetary System in 1979) and they persist for some time. Akram, Rime and Sarno (2008) We conduct several robustness checks. We repeat our regressions using changes in the basis (since the basis displays strong autocorrelation). We also repeat our analysis using high frequency (hourly) exchange rate data (this data is only available for part of our sample). Our qualitative results remain the same in all cases.
Of related papers, Griffoli and Ranaldo (2009) also find that funding constraints explain the CIP deviations but, different from us, that counterparty risk does not. The difference may arise because counterparty risk is likely to be less of a factor for the shorter maturity loans they examine (i.e. 1-week maturity compared to our 3-month maturity). Further, they assume that arbitrageurs are able to borrow at secured (i.e. OIS) rates whereas we use unsecured (i.e. Libor) funding rates when estimating CIP deviations. They find that central bank swap lines had no statistical effect on the deviations after the Lehman failure (although they do not consider the announcement of unlimited swap lines). find a decline in volatility of the basis but no change in its level due to the swap lines. They focus on CDS prices but do not consider arbitrageurs' funding constraints as determinants of CIP deviations.
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Our contribution, relative to these papers, lie in using a theoretical framework (based on Garleanu and Pedersen (2009) ) to (1) explain why the CIP deviations became positive and (2) derive empirical measures for funding constraints: the overnight repo spread between agency MBS and Treasury collaterals. The short (overnight) maturity and collaterization imply that credit risk is likely to be a small part of the spread. Garleanu and Pedersen (2009) The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section I, we describe our methodology and data. In Section II, we present estimates of CIP deviation. In sections III and IV, we discuss measures of funding constraints and counterparty risk and present results relating these measures to CIP deviations. In Section V, we assess the impact of the Federal Reserve's announcements and actual operations related to the bilateral currency swap lines on CIP deviations. We conclude in Section VI.
I. Data and Measurement of CIP Deviations
In this section, we discuss our estimates of CIP deviations and describe the data. 
Arbitrage in international capital markets should ensure that the implied dollar rate is equal to the USD Libor rate, so that the basis is zero and CIP holds. A non-zero basis in normal times is likely due to temporary mispricings that are not arbitraged away (Akram et al (2008) ).
We obtain tradable quote data on spot and 3-month forward exchange rates from Reuters, Bloomberg and Tullett Prebon, a leading broker in FX markets. Griffoli and Ranaldo (2009) 
A. Estimates of CIP deviation based on alternative dollar interest rates
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE Figure 1 shows estimates of the USD basis using equation (3) For example, for the GBP-USD currency pair, we back out an implied dollar rate using the GBP Libor rate, and the spot and forward GBP-USD exchange rates.
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE
From Figure 3 , we observe that for five other currency pairs, the basis has also widened dramatically since September 15, 2008 and generally followed a path similar to that of the euro-USD basis. Panel B of Table 1 shows the mean and maximum values of the basis estimates for different currency pairs. We observe that the mean and maximum values are similar for different currency pairs, and moreover they are comparable to those for the USD-euro pair in Panel A of Table 1 . One exception is the AUD-USD pair for which the basis appears to be high since September 16 2008 compared to the other currency pairs. Overall, the evidence supports the hypothesis of an excess demand for USD worldwide.
In this section we find robust evidence that estimates of the CIP deviation based on different dollar interest rates and currency pairs depict a similar pattern: large and positive deviations after August 2007 followed by even sharper increases following September 2008. In the remainder of the paper, we explain why the arbitrage condition implicit in the CIP relation breaks down during the crisis and we assess the effect of the Federal Reserve's announcements and actual operations related to the bilateral currency swap lines on the CIP deviations.
III. Determinants of CIP Deviations: Discussion and Empirical Methodology
In this section, we discuss a theoretical framework for understanding CIP deviations. We then use the framework to explain why the deviations were positive (section A) and to propose empirical proxies for funding constraints (section B) and credit risk (section C).
The CIP deviation may persist if funding is not available to arbitrageurs. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) show how negative shocks are amplified if investors withdraw money from funds. Gromb and Vayanos (2002) show that when margin-constrained arbitrageurs face capital scarcity, a negative shock induces them to liquidate their own positions and widen price discrepancy. 
The intuition is that the risk-tolerant investor has to pay margins on both legs of the basis trade.
A. Why were Deviations from Covered Interest Parity Positive?
In theory, deviations from CIP could be positive or negative. But, as we have seen, they were consistently positive. We use the framework of Garleanu and Pedersen (2009) to understand the sign of the basis after the crisis. In the context of CIP deviations, the implied rate may be viewed as the return from the FX swap position D while the Libor rate is the return on the spot dollar position S.
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The positive basis means that the situation described by (6) applies---leveraged investors have long positions in S (i.e. USD) and short positions in D (i.e. FX swaps). Arbitrageurs can earn riskless profits by borrowing USD for 3 months at the Libor rate and investing at the euro Libor rate, while covering the FX risk in the FX swap market. But this arbitrage trade did not occur due to the shortage of USD arising from reduced supply from lenders as well as increased
The swap dealer quotes the forward differential f/s for the swap transaction. The return to investing $1 in swaps is (1+i f )f/s which is equal to the implied rate.
10 Equations (5) and (6) are limiting results obtained when the relative wealth of the risk tolerant investor approaches zero. In the general case, the basis also depends on the difference in the covariance of returns of S and D with the consumption of the risk-tolerant agent. 11 The investor would swap dollars into euros while simultaneously agreeing to reverse the transaction at the current forward rate and closing the swap in 3 months. Non-US institutions typically obtain dollar funding in the FX swap markets, primarily from US institutions that have a natural dollar deposit base.
demand by global banks during the crisis (Coffey, Hrung, Nguyen and Sarkar (2009) ). An example of reduced dollar supply is that U.S. money market funds abruptly stopped purchasing bank-issued commercial paper after they faced large redemptions following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers (Baba, McCauley, and Ramaswamy (2009) ). On the demand side, McGuire and von Peter (2009) estimate that the USD "funding gap" of European banks had grown to at least $1.1 to $1.3 trillion by mid-2007 and they financed this gap from interbank markets, FX swap markets and central banks. As the first two funding sources dried up during the crisis, global banks had to pay a premium to obtain USD.
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
We now propose empirical proxies for margin constraints and the shadow cost of capital as determinants of the basis. Since arbitrage transactions are not riskless in reality, we also discuss a number of risk measures. A summary of all variable definitions is in Table 2 .
B. Empirical proxy for margin constraint and shadow cost of capital
In this section, we propose empirical measures for relative margin constraints and the shadow cost of capital, the two variables in (6).
Our empirical proxy for the tightness of margin conditions is the overnight agency MBSTreasury repo spread which is the repo rate using agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS) as collateral minus the repo rate using Treasury securities as collateral. 12 12 These are general collateral (GC) repo rates that reference non-specific government securities with the lowest level of counterparty risk (Hordahl and King (2008) ). In contrast, specific collateral rates reference particular types of collateral, such as an on-the-run bond.
Repos have become a primary source of funding for commercial banks, investment banks and securities lenders in recent times. By mid-2008, the gross amount of repos outstanding (including double counting) had exceeded $10 trillion, about the same as the total value of assets in the US banking system (Hordahl and King (2008) ). Since both MBS and Treasury repo loans are collaterized, and given the short (overnight) maturity, the spread between them mainly reflects the relative market illiquidity of the two assets. In particular, agency MBS securities became highly illiquid during the crisis, leading to an increase in the agency MBS-Treasury repo spread. 13 Since margins are expected to increase with market illiquidity (Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) Therefore, we expect a positive relation between CIP deviations and the repo spreads.
Since we are examining the USD basis at a 3-month maturity, we also use the 3-month agency MBS-Treasury repo rate. The 3-month rate is relevant if banks are concerned about maturity mismatch between funding and investments. A caveat is that counterparty risk may be a larger component of the repo spread for the 3-month maturity (although increases in credit risk may increase the haircut on the loan rather than the repo rate). The data is from Bloomberg who in turn source the data from ICAP North America, a large interdealer broker. Longstaff (2000) uses this data in his analysis of the term structure of repo rates.
13 Brunnermeier (2009) uses the repo spread (although not of the overnight maturity) to illustrate liquidity risk during the crisis. Gorton and Metrick (2009) discuss the role of repo markets during the financial crisis. 14 Garleanu and Pedersen (2009) use the tightness of credit condition variable in the senior officer bank loan survey as a proxy for increasing tightness. This data, however, is only available at the quarterly frequency.
As discussed in Gromb and Vayanos (2002) and Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) , funding liquidity and market liquidity premia are tightly linked. Since the repo spread is intended to capture funding conditions, we also include in our regressions a market liquidity risk measure. This is the par-OTR yield spread, defined as the yield of a hypothetical 10-year off-therun par bond minus the on-the-run 10-year Treasury yield. The data for the on-the-run 10-year Treasury yield is from Haver Analytics while the par bond yields are from the Federal Reserve
Board.
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The expected sign of the correlation between illiquidity measures and the basis is ambiguous. Increases in the par-OTR spread have two effects. Increased illiquidity in the US markets makes it less likely that US institutions would be willing to supply dollars in off-shore dollar markets which should increase the basis. However, increased illiquidity also increases unsecured interest rates in the US, which tends to decrease the basis.
The par-OTR spread is a measure of the market liquidity premium in the Treasury market and is taken to be a proxy for systematic market liquidity risk in the economy. Since
Treasury yields usually fall when demand for liquid and safe securities rises, systematic liquidity premia is likely to be correlated with Treasury liquidity premia. Garleanu and Pedersen (2009) show that the arbitrageur's shadow cost of capital is the interest rate spread between an uncollaterized and collaterized loan. We use the 3-month TED spread (i.e. the Libor minus the Treasury bill rate) and the 3-month Libor-Repo spread as proxies for the shadow cost of capital. 15 The hypothetical 10-year Treasury trading at par is derived from a Nelson-Siegel-Svensson zero-coupon curve estimated from off-the-run Treasury coupon securities. In contrast to our approach, prior literature has used the yield on an actual off-the-run bond to compute the on-off spread. However, the actual yield depends on the specialness of Treasury securities (Duffie (1996) ) potentially leading to negative on-off-spreads, as has frequently been the case in recent periods.
C. Empirical measures of counterparty risk
To the extent that arbitrage became risky during the crisis, CIP deviations need not constitute violations of the Law of One Price. Counterparty risk increased substantially during the crisis, which increased unsecured rates. Even secured funding sources such as FX swaps were affected since there was increased probability that the contracts would have to be replaced on unfavorable terms in case of counterparty default (Duffie and Huang (1996) ).
Our credit risk measures are:
• CDX: The CDX investment grade (IG) index of CDS prices probabilities assigned by lenders to a borrower's investments). The expected sign of the correlation of credit risk with the basis depends on whether the credit risk is greater for US or for non-US institutions. If the credit risk increases more for non-US firms then i F increases more than USD Libor and so the basis increases; in the reverse case, the basis decreases.
Finally, we control for foreign exchange risk and general market risk using:
• EVOL: Options-implied volatility in the euro-USD foreign exchange market.
• VIX: Options-implied volatility in the equity market
The implied volatility for the euro-USD exchange rate is calculated by JP Morgan, and this data is obtained from Bloomberg. FX volatility determines the cost of hedging FX risk. The equity implied volatility is given by the VIX measure, data for which is pulled from Bloomberg. Since previous work has found VIX to be a significant determinant of asset prices in several markets, we take VIX to stand for the risk aversion of investors in the broader financial markets.
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IV. Explaining CIP Deviations: Results
In this section, we explain deviations in CIP using measures of funding constraints and risk measures. We examine whether CIP deviations constitute a breakdown in the Law of One Price due to capital constraints of arbitrageurs---specifically, changes in margin constraints and arbitrageurs' cost of capital (section A). In section B, we explore the hypothesis that CIP deviations reflect the increased credit risk of arbitrage transactions. In section C, we decompose aggregate credit risk into the credit risk of non-US institutions relative to US firms.
A. CIP deviations, margin constraints and shadow cost of capital
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE
16 VIX has been found to be a significant determinant of prices of foreign exchange (Brunnermeier, Nagel and Pedersen (2008) ), and sovereign CDS (Longstaff, Pan, Pedersen and Singleton (2007) ).
Arbitrageurs' funding constraints are determined by the tightness of margin conditions and their shadow cost of capital. Figure 4 plots the Agency MBS-Treasury repo spread (our proxy for margin conditions) for the overnight (MBS-T-ON) and 3 month (MBS-T-M3) maturities along with CIP deviations based on the euro-dollar FX rate and the USD Libor rate.
Except for brief periods after the Lehman bankruptcy, the repo spreads are positive, consistent with the greater illiquidity of MBS relative to Treasuries. We observe that the basis and repo spreads co-move for much of the period.
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE Table 3 
INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE
The expected association between the CIP deviation and the TED or the Libor-Repo spread is positive and Figure 5 shows that they generally co-move together, as also shown by Garleanu and Pedersen (2009 Table 4 shows results from a regression of the USD basis on its own lag, the repo spread, Table 4 repeats the regressions using the 3-month repo spread. The results are qualitatively similar to those using the overnight spread: the repo spread is generally positively associated with CIP deviations except during the period when TSLF was initiated. The Par-OTR spread becomes negatively and significantly related to CIP deviations in the post-Lehman period, whereas the coefficient is positive and insignificant when using the overnight repo spread. The difference likely reflects differences in the correlation of Par-OTR with the overnight and 3-month repo spreads in this period (see Panel C of Table 3 ).
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE Table 5 repeats these regressions while replacing the TED spread with the Libor-Repo spread. These results generally track those for the TED spread: a positive relationship of CIP deviations with margin conditions (except during the pre-Lehman crisis period) and with the Libor-Repo spread. EVOL and VIX have a correlation of close to 50% with the basis in the pre-Lehman period and more moderate correlation afterwards.
B. CIP deviations, credit risk and liquidity risk
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE
In Table 6 , we show results from a regression that expands on the previous analysis by 
C. Relative credit risk of US versus non-US firms
The expected sign of the correlation of credit risk with the basis depends on whether the credit risk increases more for US firms (which increases USD Libor) or more for non-US institutions (which increases the foreign interest rate i F ). Therefore, we define a measure of relative default risk:
• Relative default risk: The average CDS prices of 13 non-US banks in the Libor panel minus the average CDS prices of 10 systematically important US banks. banks has increased more than large non-US banks during the crisis. Therefore, we expect the relative credit risk measure to be negatively correlated with the basis.
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE Table 7 shows results from a regression with the CDX index replaced by the relative credit risk of non-US vis-à-vis US banks. For brevity, we only show results for funding constraints and credit risk measures. The results in Panel A, using the TED spread, shows that the relative credit risk measure is significant in the crisis periods. The results in Panel B, using the Libor-Repo spread, shows that it is significant in every period except the pre-Lehman crisis period. In both panels, the sign is positive in the pre-crisis and negative in the crisis period, consistent with expectations. Relative credit risk is another measure of dispersion (between US and non-US firms instead of between Libor banks, as was the case earlier). The results therefore provide further evidence of the significance of this measure, especially after the Lehman failure.
The results indicate that tighter margin conditions associated with higher CIP deviations.
An exception is the early period of the crisis when the Fed intervened to relax collateral constraints, at a time when CIP deviations were still increasing. However, market liquidity risk (i.e. the on-off Treasury spread) remains a significant determinant of CIP deviations even during this period. Overall, funding constraints were significant determinants of the basis in all periods.
The cost of capital is a significant determinant of the basis, with the sign depending on whether the impact is greater in the euro or the dollar markets. Credit risk--and, in particular, its dispersion---is particularly important in understanding CIP deviations during the post-Lehman crisis period. Indeed, the Federal Reserve provided unlimited amounts of dollars to foreign Central Banks after September 20008. In the next section, we examine whether the Fed's dollar liquidity supply eased funding constraints and reduced the basis.
V. Central Bank Currency Swaps and CIP Deviations
In this section, we investigate the effect of Federal Reserve announcements and actual operations related to the swap lines on CIP deviations. To the extent that the deviations are due to arbitrageur's funding constraints in the international money markets, the supply of dollars by the Federal Reserve may be expected to alleviate the problem. In the Fed's bilateral currency swap arrangements, it supplies USD in exchange for foreign currency for a specified period to foreign Central Banks who then supplies USD to banks in its own jurisdictions via auctions.
INSERT and the Swiss National Bank (SNB). As the USD shortage became more acute, the program was expanded in size and scope. After Lehman's bankruptcy, the cap on the amount of funds distributed was removed altogether on October 13 2008, when the Fed promised to accommodate any quantity demanded at the auctions.
To determine the effect of the swap lines program, we define a dummy variable that equals 1 on days when the Fed announces an increase in funds supplied. Correspondingly, the dummy has value -1 on February 1 2008 when the ECB withdrew from the February auctions, and so effectively this constituted a negative supply event. We define a separate dummy variable for the October 13 announcement "uncapping" the swap lines. We also define a dummy variable for days when the Fed conducted TAF auctions where US banks and US branches of foreign banks participated and bid for USD. We do not include dummy variables for ECB auction dates since these dates coincided with TAF auction days leading to a collinearity problem in the regressions. Since auction days are scheduled ahead of time on specific days of the month, we expect the swap program to have an impact mainly on announcement days, perhaps with the exception of the initial auctions when banks were still learning about the program.
Since the swap lines are expected to reduce liquidity risk, we control for credit risk but not for liquidity risk in estimating their effects. Also, we use the change rather than the level of the basis as the dependent variable. This is necessary to account for persistence in the impact of swap lines on the basis, given that we are using dummy variables to capture the effect of swap lines. 18 We estimate the following regression to examine the effect of swap lines on the basis: CONTROL includes the CDX index, Disp., VIX, and EVOL. In addition, we include the term spread defined as the difference between the 10-year Treasury note and the 3-month bill (both constant maturity). We control for term risk since the loans are for term maturities (mostly for 28 and 84 day maturities) and their effectiveness may depend on the shape of the yield curve.
INSERT TABLE 9 HERE
The results of the regression are in Table 9 
VI. Conclusion
In this paper, we document substantial and significant deviations from CIP during the financial crisis, with particularly dramatic deviations following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. This result is robust to the use of alternative benchmark dollar interest rates and different currency pairs. Our results show that funding constraints of arbitrageurs (as measured by our proxies for margin conditions and the cost of capital) are significant determinants of CIP deviations. In addition, we find evidence that uncertainty about counterparty risk became an issue after September 2008, as cash flows previously perceived as riskless became risky. These results indicate limits to arbitrage transactions in the international capital markets during the crisis partly due funding constraints and partly due to counterparty credit risk.
To ease short-term dollar funding constraints, the Federal Reserve agreed to supply dollars to foreign central banks via reciprocal currency arrangements (swap lines) with several developed and a few emerging market countries. We find that announcement days of the swap lines program were associated with a reduction in the basis. We further find that the actual auctions of dollars were also effective in bringing down the basis on the day of the operations.
The announcement that swap lines would become uncapped in October 2008 resulted in a reduction of more than 55 basis points in the basis. Although subsequent announcements of swap lines programs did not have a significant effect on the basis, these results appear to point to the success of the Federal Reserve in acting as the international lender of last resort at a time when short-term dollar funding was impaired globally. Basis USD interest rate implied by the CIP relation ("the implied rate") minus the USD LIBOR rate. The implied rate is estimated using the euro-dollar spot and forward exchange rates and the euro LIBOR rate.
MBS-T ON
Agency MBS repo rate minus Treasury repo rate, both of overnight maturity.
MBS-T M3
Agency MBS repo rate minus Treasury repo rate, both of 3-month maturity. Libor-Repo LIBOR rate minus Treasury repo rate, both of 3-month maturity. TED LIBOR rate minus Treasury bill rate, both of 3-month maturity. Par-OTR Yield on hypothetical off-the-run Treasury trading at par minus on-the-run Treasury yield, both of 10-year maturity CDX CDX IG index NUS-US CDS Average of CDS prices of 13 non-US banks in LIBOR panel minus average of CDS prices of 10 systemically important US banks Disp.
Maximum minus minimum quote of banks in USD LIBOR panel VIX Equity implied volatility Index EVOL Euro-US dollar exchange rate implied volatility Swap ann.
Dummy variable equal to 1 on days with announcements of the Fed's currency swap lines program (dates in The table shows the correlations between the basis and its determinants for the pre-crisis period ( Table 2 . The figure plots estimates of Covered Interest Rate Parity (CIP) deviations in US dollars (USD) (i.e. the USD Basis), calculated as the CIP implied USD rate minus the USD LIBOR rate. The CIP implied USD rate is estimated using the euro-dollar exchange rate and the euro LIBOR rate. The dashed line is based on daily exchange rate data and the solid line is based on hourly exchange rate data. The sample period is from January 1 2007 till March 30 2009 except for the hourly data which is available from May 23 2008. The figure plots estimates of Covered Interest Rate Parity (CIP) deviations in US dollars (USD) (i.e. the USD Basis), calculated as the CIP implied USD rate minus several benchmark USD rates. The benchmark USD rates shown are the USD LIBOR rate (left axis), the NYFR rate (left axis) and the Treasury Bill rate (right axis). The CIP implied rate USD is estimated using daily euro-dollar exchange rates and the euro LIBOR rate. The sample period is from January 1 The figure plots estimates of Covered Interest Rate Parity (CIP) deviations in US dollars (USD) (i.e. the USD Basis), calculated as the CIP implied USD rate minus the USD LIBOR rate. The CIP implied USD rate is is estimated using exchange rates and interest rates denominated in the following currencies: the Australian dollar (AUD), the Swiss franc (CHF), the British pound (GBP), the Japanese Yen (JPY) and the New Zealand dollar (NZD). The sample period is from January 1 Jan-07 Apr-07 Jul-07 Oct-07 Jan-08 Apr-08 Jul-08 Oct-08 Jan-09
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Figure 6: Difference between CDS Prices of non-US and US Banks
The figure plots the relative default risk of non-US firms relative to US firms. This is estimated as the average CDS prices of 13 non-US banks in the Libor panel minus the average CDS prices of 10 systematically important US banks. The 10 systematically important US banks are those defined by the Treasury in its TARP plan. 
